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ABSTRACT 
 
Assessment of Driving Mental Models as a Predictor of Crashes and Moving Violations. 
(May 2011) 
Gonzalo Javier Muñoz Gálvez, B. S., Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Winfred Arthur, Jr. 
 
 The purpose of the current study was to assess the efficacy of mental models as a 
predictor of driving outcomes. In contrast to more traditional measures of knowledge, 
mental models capture the configural property of knowledge, that is, an individual’s 
understanding of the interrelationships that exist among critical concepts within a 
particular knowledge domain. Given that research has consistently shown the usefulness 
of mental models for the prediction of performance in a number of settings, it was 
hypothesized that the development of accurate driving mental models would also play an 
important role in the prediction of driving outcomes, especially in comparison to 
traditional measures of driving knowledge—such as the multiple-choice type tests 
typically required to obtain a driver license.  
 Mental models of 130 college students (52% females) between 17 and 21 years-
old (M = 18.68, SD = 0.80) were analyzed and compared to a subject matter expert 
(SME) referent structure using Pathfinder. A statistically significant correlation was 
found for mental model accuracy and moving violations (r = –.18, p <.05), but not for at-
iv 
fault crashes. Evidence of incremental validity of mental models over commonly used 
predictors of moving violations (but not for at-fault crashes) was also found. Exploratory 
analyses revealed that driving knowledge, general mental ability (GMA), and emotional 
stability were the best predictors of mental model accuracy. 
 Issues related to the measurement of mental models were extensively addressed. 
First, statistically significant correlations between GMA and several mental model 
properties (i.e., accuracy scores, within participant similarity, and within participant 
correlation) suggest that challenges inherent to the task for eliciting mental models may 
influence mental model scores which, in turn, may lower mental model reliability 
estimates. Also, the selection of model components (i.e., terms) and the identification of 
the ―best‖ reference structure for deriving mental model accuracy scores are undoubtedly 
critical aspects of mental model-related research. Along with illustrating the decisions 
made in the context of this particular study, some suggestions for conducting mental 
model-related research are provided. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
there were 5.8 million crashes in 2008 with an estimated 2.35 million people injured and 
37,261 people killed which translates into a fatality rate of 1.27 per 100 million vehicle 
miles traveled (NHTSA, 2009a). In occupational settings, it has been estimated that 
transportation incidents account for 42% of workplace-related fatalities (Solis & Hall, 
2009). Needless to say, the costs of traffic crashes are enormous, both for organizations 
and society. 
 Driving is a complex task that can be influenced by a myriad of individual 
differences, such as driving knowledge, information processing, demographic variables, 
exposure factors, and personality. An objective of the present study was to contribute to 
a further understanding of driving crashes and moving violations by introducing mental 
models to this stream of research. In contrast to more traditional measures of 
knowledge—which focus on the number of facts an individual can recognize or recall—
mental models capture how knowledge is organized into meaningful conceptual 
structures to describe, explain, and predict future states of a given system (Rouse & 
Morris, 1986). Research has shown that the development of accurate mental models  
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plays a significant role in predicting performance on complex and dynamic tasks (Day, 
Arthur, & Gettman, 2001; Kraiger, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995), and thus, it is 
hypothesized that mental models should also play a significant role in the prediction of 
driving outcomes. 
 The validity of mental models as a predictor of crashes and moving violations 
must be assessed in conjunction with other predictors previously examined in the 
driving-related literature. Arthur and Day (2009) argued that a combination of individual 
differences for the prediction of driving crashes is consistent with the need to recognize 
the role of the whole individual in driving-related behaviors. They further demonstrated 
the usefulness of combining multiple predictor categories for predicting crashes and 
moving violations, over and above the usage of any single variable. In this sense, the 
specific objective of the current study was to investigate the incremental validity of 
mental models over and above other commonly used predictors in this domain, namely, 
demographic variables, exposure factors, information processing variables, and 
personality.  
 Although mental models have been successfully used as predictors of various 
performance criteria in academic and organizational contexts, this study represents, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first time mental models have been used as a predictor of 
driving outcomes. For this reason, a secondary objective of this study was to explore the 
relationship between mental models and the previously mentioned set of driving 
outcome predictors. This query aims to situate mental models among driving predictors’ 
nomological network. Specifically, general mental ability (GMA), driving experience, 
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and personality were hypothesized to play an important role in the development of 
driving mental models. Hopefully, exploring these associations will shed light on the 
processes that underlie the development of mental models. 
 As is true with any other predictor variable, the validity of mental models as 
predictors of driving outcomes relies heavily on the quality of their measurement. As is 
well known, reliability represents the degree to which observed individual scores are 
indicative of their corresponding true scores (or latent dimension of interest). 
Specifically, reliability is the R
2
-index associated with the regression of observed scores 
on true scores (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2011). Unless the association between an 
observed score and its correspondent true score is perfect (R
2 
= 1), the observed 
predictor-criterion association will be less than the association between the latent factor 
and the specified criterion (R
2 
< 1). Because of its relationship with error of prediction, 
predictor reliability must be taken into account when assessing the validity of any given 
predictor. Unfortunately, standard procedures for assessing reliability do not apply to 
mental model measurement without difficulty (at least as operationalized using 
Pathfinder). For instance, participants’ mental models are not analyzable by means of 
internal consistency estimates based on correlational methods (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha). 
Instead, mental model internal consistency must be assessed by means of coherence 
scores. Test-retest reliability can be assessed using mental model accuracy score 
correlations, within participant mental model correlations, and within participant 
similarity scores, but the relationship between these indexes is yet unclear. 
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 Another measurement related concern is the decision process involved in 
selecting the best SME mental model to be used as a reference structure (i.e., a standard 
for comparing other mental models). Although a reference structure quality may be 
inferred by examining its properties (i.e., coherence scores and number of links), a 
rational examination of a mental model’s quality may well contradict an empirical test of 
a reference structure’s aptness for predicting a given criterion. For instance, a SME 
referent structure may show low internal consistency (i.e., low coherence score) but still 
be useful for predicting driving outcomes. Finally, a critical process in mental model 
measurement is that of sampling the right set and number of terms from the knowledge 
domain a mental model is purportedly representing. Because resultant mental models are 
fully determined by the components introduced by the researcher, selecting the terms 
may undoubtedly bias mental model assessment. The purpose of this study was not to 
give a definite answer for these or similar problems, and some of them may depend on 
following standard test development recommendations. However, the absence of clear-
cut guidelines for carrying out some critical processes warrants some discussion. At any 
rate, the present study may serve to illustrate some of these issues (and how to handle 
them), and hopefully to engender further research on the topic of mental model 
measurement.  
 In the first portion of this thesis, a literature review of previously studied 
predictors of driving outcomes will be presented. Next, mental models will be defined—
both theoretically and operationally—and introduced into this stream of research; the 
main hypothesis of this study will be introduced in this context.   
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2. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT MODELS FOR PREDICTING CRASHES 
AND MOVING VIOLATIONS 
 
 The purpose of the following sections is to review some variables commonly 
used in the driving literature—including demographic variables, exposure factors, 
information processing variables, and personality—and examine their relationship with 
crashes and moving violations.  
2.1 Demographic variables 
 Age and sex are probably the most commonly used predictors in the vehicle 
crash literature. First, there is evidence that most crashes occur among young male 
drivers. Twenty-three percent of all traffic fatalities occur among individuals 16 to 24 
years old, the highest rate of involvement in fatal crashes on a per population basis 
(NHTSA, 2009b), and male drivers are involved in roughly three times more fatal 
crashes than women (NHTSA, 2009b). In spite of these figures, some researchers have 
argued that age and sex are proxies for other predictor variables more closely related to 
crash involvement, such as information processing and personality. Arthur et al. (1990) 
demonstrated that the correlation between age and crash rate was no longer significant 
after controlling for a test of selective attention, which suggests that a direct measure of 
information-processing ability is a better predictor than age per se. Williams and Carsten 
(1989) observed that the crash rate per miles driven for older drivers (65 years and older) 
is about the same as the crash rate per miles driven among younger drivers. The scarce 
attention to this problem among the elderly population is probably due to the fact that the 
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total number of crashes among older drivers is lower in comparison to the rest of the 
population, a result that is certainly misleading by itself unless one pays attention to the 
number of miles driven per week—another exposure factor that is reviewed in the next 
section. In general then, when making comparisons between populations it is important 
to keep in mind that the effect of the grouping variable on the criterion may be mediated 
by other predictor(s).  
2.2 Exposure factors 
 Driving experience has been associated with driving performance improvement. 
Bellet, Bailly-Asuni, Mayenobe, and Banet (2009) demonstrated that experienced 
drivers outperform novice drivers in a situational awareness task. In this task, 
participants were requested to compare an image of a video sequence that was 
previously shown to them, and then indicate whether or not the image was modified 
(deletion or addition of a relevant element). Experienced drivers were able to detect 75% 
of the modifications (i.e., a pedestrian approaching the corner), whereas the novice 
drivers were able to identify only 59% of them. 
 With increased practice drivers gain driving-experience. However, this increase 
in the amount of driving is concomitant with more exposure, and subsequently a greater 
likelihood of being involved in traffic crashes and receiving more tickets. So, consonant 
with this, research typically shows that driving years is also positively associated with a 
higher number of crashes and moving violations. For instance, Arthur and Day (2009) 
found a positive correlation of .26 between driving years and at-fault crashes, and .43 
with moving violations in a sample of college students. 
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 Obviously, driving experience is also closely related to age, such that older 
drivers typically have more driving experience than younger drivers. Arthur and Day 
(2009) found a correlation of .84 between age and driving experience. At the same time, 
there is some evidence that as experienced drivers reach a certain age (65 years old), a 
reduction in cognitive capacities may hinder their driving performance in comparison 
with experienced drivers under 40 years old (Bellet et al., 2009). Nevertheless, even 
when differences in performance among different age groups have been found, they can 
often be attributed to within-group differences in information processing ability rather 
than age per se (Arthur, Barrett, & Doverspike, 1990). In other words, between group 
variance in performance associated with differences in age do not preclude the existence 
of within group differences on other variables relevant for predicting driving outcomes.  
 In general, the association between driving experience and driving outcomes 
must be examined with caution, especially in samples including elderly drivers in which 
driving experience may not be sufficient to compensate for the negative effect of 
reduced information processing capabilities relevant for competent driving. At the same 
time, it is reasonable to expect that as time elapses and driving experience accumulates, 
more practice will not necessarily produce better driving outcomes. In fact, once drivers 
have acquired the requisite knowledge and skill for driving, other predictors may play a 
more important role in the prediction of driving outcomes (e.g., personality). Finally, it 
is not unreasonable to posit that during the first stages of learning to drive, high ability 
individuals will acquire more knowledge and generate more accurate mental models than 
low ability individuals. Therefore, including driving experience as a predictor of 
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performance is relevant only to the extent that it is associated with an increase in driving 
knowledge which, in turn, may be mediated by other factors—specifically, GMA. 
2.3 Information processing 
 Driving is a complex task that requires ―perceiving, identifying, processing, and 
adequately responding to pertinent information (e.g., traffic lights, signs, pedestrians, 
other vehicles, etc.) in the environment‖ (Arthur & Day, 2009, p. 127). Because driving 
is complex, research should not underestimate the importance of having the necessary 
cognitive resources to successfully perform this task. Yet, it is not uncommon to find 
primary studies that fail to establish a consistent linkage between information-processing 
skills and crashes (see Arthur & Day, 2009).  
 GMA is one of the most successful information processing variables for 
predicting core (educational outcomes, occupational training, job performance) and 
peripheral criterion domains (such as crime, health risks, and poverty; Lubinski, 2000); 
however, its usefulness for predicting traffic crashes has not received empirical support 
in comparison to other information processing variables such as selective attention and 
perceptual style (Arthur, Barret, & Alexander, 1991). Arthur et al.’s (1991) meta-
analysis identified selective attention and perceptual style as valid predictors of 
automobile crashes, with corrected mean rs of .26 and .15 respectively; in contrast, they 
found only marginally favorable results for cognitive ability, mean r = .12, 95% CI [.06, 
.18]. 
 In their meta-analysis of dual-task driving studies, Horrey and Wickens (2006) 
demonstrated a significant deterioration of driving performance resulting from cellular 
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phone usage, an effect that was found to be equivalent for both hand-held and hands-free 
devices. Bellet et al.’s (2009) review also suggests that drivers in dual-task conditions 
show significant decreases in their ability to accurately represent their driving 
environment, therefore increasing their likelihood of being involved in a vehicle crash. 
These results run counter to a widespread belief in one’s ability to perform multiple 
tasks while driving (e.g., texting and driving). For instance, it has been estimated that 
11% of vehicles are being driven by someone using a hand-held or hands-free cell phone 
at any given daylight moment (NHTSA, 2009c). 
 In sum, research in this domain should not underestimate the complexity of 
driving-related tasks and the importance of having the necessary cognitive resources 
available to perform the driving task successfully. While the main purpose of this study 
is to test the efficacy of mental models—a measure of knowledge organization—as a 
predictor of driving outcomes, it is critical to keep in mind that information processing 
ability influences both skill acquisition and performance. As stated in the previous 
section, drivers with similar training may differ with regard to the time they need to 
develop sound and accurate driving mental models.  
2.4 Personality 
2.4.1 Five-factor model 
 The rationale for a multiple-predictor perspective to the prediction of driving 
outcomes is that crash involvement stems from two distinct sources of anomalous 
behavior, namely errors and violations (Arthur et al., 1991). While errors result from 
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failures in information processing ability, violations are more motivational, and reflect 
the preferences and choices the driver makes while driving. In turn, preferences and 
choices reflect a driver’s personality. 
 Historically, a large number of personality variables have been used to predict 
crashes and moving violations. Fortunately, today there is a broad consensus on the use 
of the five-factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1987) for the study of personality and its 
relationship with relevant outcomes, especially in the field of personnel psychology and 
the prediction of job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; 
Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Some of these personality variables, commonly used 
in organizational and personnel psychology research, have been successfully used in the 
prediction of crash involvement and moving violations. Clarke and Robertson’s (2005) 
meta-analysis revealed that extraversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness are valid 
predictors of crash involvement, with corrected mean validities of .24, .26 and .21, 
respectively.  
 Clarke and Robertson’s (2005) results support the notion that high extraversion is 
associated with greater number of crashes on the road, but not with crashes in 
occupational contexts which, according to the authors, suggests that crash involvement 
in the case of extraverts may be related to monotonous or routine tasks. This evidence is 
consistent with the idea that extraverts have a somewhat lower level of vigilance, that is, 
the ability to sustain a high level of attention over long periods of time (Koelega, 1992; 
Schmidt, Beauducel, Brocke, & Strobel, 2004). Another argument that has been 
forwarded is that extroverts are high sensation seekers, and therefore have a tendency to 
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take greater risks when driving. Jonah’s (1997) review reported a wealth of evidence 
supporting an association between sensation seeking and risky driving, including 
evidence suggesting that neurochemical differences in the brain as well as genetic 
factors underlie individual differences associated with risky driving.  
 In comparison to low conscientious individuals, those high in conscientiousness 
describe themselves as more careful, reliable, self-disciplined, persevering, and 
perceptive, among other things (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Not surprisingly, a number of 
studies have established a relatively consistent relationship between conscientiousness 
and driving outcomes (Arthur & Doverspike, 2001; Arthur & Graziano, 1996). For 
instance, Arthur and Graziano (1996) demonstrated a significant inverse relationship 
between conscientiousness and driving crash involvement in a sample of college 
students. Using a multivariate analysis of variance approach they found a small but 
significant mean difference between a group of participants who had one or more at-fault 
crashes in comparison to a group of individuals who reported no crashes in the same 
period of time. The same pattern of results was obtained for a sample drawn from a 
temporary employment agency. Bogg and Roberts’ (2004) meta-analysis also confirmed 
that conscientiousness is associated with risky driving behaviors, such as drinking and 
driving, and speeding. 
 Low agreeableness individuals may be less able to cooperate with others and 
more prone to react aggressively to situations (Clarke & Robertson, 2005). The 
relationship between aggression—to a certain extent, the opposite of agreeableness—and 
crashes has been previously documented. An 8–year longitudinal study conducted in 
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New Zealand showed a significant relationship between some personality factors of the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) and crashes among young adults 
(Gulliver & Begg, 2007). After controlling for driving exposure, they found that high 
levels of aggression (i.e., will frighten and cause discomfort to others), high levels of 
alienation (i.e., feels mistreated), and low levels of traditionalism (i.e., does not endorse 
high moral standards) were predictive of driving crashes. Consistent with these findings, 
West, Elander, and French (1993) found a positive association between number of 
crashes and mild social deviance, the tendency to engage in antisocial behavior from 
which harm to others would be a likely consequence (i.e., drive down the hard shoulder 
of a motorway when other lanes are jammed). Arthur et al.’s (1991) meta-analysis 
provided support for the linkage between number of crashes, general activity level (an 
aggression-related measure), and regard for authority, but only for a sub-population of 
professional drivers, not for the general population.    
 The efficacy of personality variables for predicting driving crashes has been 
established not only individually, but also when used in combination or as a set (Arthur 
& Day, 2009). According to Arthur and Day, the effect of a combination of personality 
variables (agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and 
openness) accounts for a statistically significant amount of variance over and above the 
variance explained by demographic and information processing variables when crashes 
or moving violations are used as criteria. Again, these results point to the importance and 
meaningfulness of using the ―whole‖ person approach for predicting crashes and moving 
violations.  
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2.4.2 General and specific locus of control 
 Locus of control is a personality trait that represents the extent to which 
individuals perceive rewards or reinforcement as contingent upon their own behavior, 
skills, or internal dispositions (Rotter, 1966). If a person consistently interprets 
rewarding events as resulting from his/her own actions or internal dispositions, that 
person is said to have an internal locus of control. Conversely, if similar events are 
consistently perceived as the result of luck, fate, or some kind of external force, the 
person is said to have an external locus of control. The belief in internal or external locus 
of control reflects different kinds of learning paradigms which may play an important 
role during skill acquisition as well as performance. For instance, if a driver believes that 
crashes are the result of luck, he/she will regard safety-related driving behaviors as less 
important, and therefore, these behaviors will be less likely to be learned or enacted. 
 Arthur et al.’s (1991) meta-analysis obtained a mean r of .20 for locus of control 
and crash involvement. However, most of the studies included in this meta-analysis used 
Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale, a measure that reflects a very broad or general 
disposition to attribute rewards to internal or external causes. The lack of specificity in 
Rotter’s operationalization of locus of control has been discussed in the context of the 
frame-of-reference literature, which emphasizes the importance of imposing a specific 
frame of reference on test takers to improve the validity of personality scales (Lievens, 
De Corte, & Schollaert, 2008). A recent meta-analysis by Qiang, Bowling, and 
Eschleman (2010) revealed that a domain-specific measure of locus of control (work 
locus of control) was correlated with work-related criteria—such as job attitudes, job 
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performance, and life satisfaction, among other things—over and beyond the effect of 
general locus of control.  
 Whereas the frame-of-reference approach has been successfully used to improve 
the validity of personality tests in the context of work-related behaviors, its value in the 
context of driving-related behaviors has received mixed support. Using a postdictive 
design, Montag and Comrey (1987) obtained a multiple correlation of .38 between fatal 
crashes and the Montag Driving Internality and Driving Externality (MDIE) scale, a 
measure of locus of control tailored specifically to driving behavior. In contrast to the 
initial findings of Montag and Comrey, Arthur and Doverspike’s (1992) study showed 
that although a statistically significant correlation between MDIE and not-at-fault 
crashes was found, this correlation was in the opposite direction to that typically 
hypothesized by the locus of control-crash involvement research (r = –.16, p < .05). 
 In sum, whereas personality testing research tends to support the frame-of-
reference approach—in particular, a domain-specific measure of locus of control in the 
context of work-related behaviors—the advantage of using modified scales to measure 
locus of control within the context of driving-related behaviors has yet to be determined. 
2.5 Driving knowledge 
 State regulations typically require driver license applicants to take a knowledge 
test, or provide evidence that the person has completed a valid driver education course. 
Moreover, under certain circumstances, drivers may dismiss traffic tickets from driving 
records by taking a defensive driving course. However, empirical assessments of the 
relationship between knowledge and traffic crashes suggest that declarative knowledge 
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is not a valid predictor of traffic crashes (Arthur & Doverspike, 2001). This empirical 
finding is consistent with Ackerman’s (1988) learning acquisition model, in which 
declarative knowledge predicts skill acquisition in early stages, but not in later stages 
where other individual differences (such as perceptual speed ability and psychomotor 
ability) play a larger role. Ackerman (1988) argued that ―broad intellectual abilities 
appear to correlate substantially with initial task performance, but these correlations 
diminish as skills are acquired. Furthermore, some perceptual-motor abilities that 
initially show small correlations with performance increase during practice‖ (p. 289). In 
other words, there are both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence suggesting that 
declarative knowledge is not a valid predictor of traffic crashes.  
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3. DRIVING MENTAL MODELS AS A PREDICTOR OF CRASHES AND 
MOVING VIOLATIONS 
 
 The complex and dynamic nature of knowledge requires the use of an inclusive 
taxonomy that captures the different facets of knowledge, and identifies the appropriate 
assessment techniques to represent and evaluate distinct learning outcomes. Kraiger, 
Ford, and Salas (1993) described three general categories of learning outcomes—
cognitive, skill-based, and affective. These authors identified knowledge organization as 
one of the three learning categories comprising the cognitive domain (along with verbal 
knowledge and cognitive strategies). Knowledge organization is a higher order level of 
knowledge that captures the relationships that exist between a set of concepts within a 
given knowledge domain. In turn, a mental model is a structural representation of an 
individual’s knowledge organization that allows us to capture this configural property of 
knowledge. The present study represents an attempt to expand the cognitive-predictor 
domain in the driving-related literature by introducing mental models, a cognitively-
based measure of learning for assessing how knowledge is structured. Consonant with 
Kraiger et al., it is argued that as expertise in the driving domain develops, traditional 
knowledge tests would not be as sensitive as mental models in discriminating between 
individuals with different levels of proficiency, and therefore, mental models will 
increase the ability to predict driving outcomes. In the next section, the theoretical 
underpinnings of mental model research as well as the operationalization of this 
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construct will be discussed along with the rationale for using mental models as a 
potential predictor of crashes and moving violations.  
3.1 Mental models: Conceptual delimitation and research findings  
 A mental model is a network of associations between concepts in an individual’s 
mind. Mental models have been described as a form of intuitive knowledge that serves as 
a frame of reference for interpreting the world which forms the bases for reasoning and 
working with problems (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kraiger et al., 1993; Rouse & Morris, 
1986). Accordingly, mental model assessment techniques elicit the configural property 
of knowledge—in contrast to traditional knowledge tests which measure the amount of 
information an individual can recognize or recall.  
 Mental models can be measured using multiple techniques, although structural 
assessment is the most common approach for assessing knowledge structures (Kraiger et 
al., 1993). Structural assessment implementation involves three steps: (a) knowledge 
elicitation, (b) knowledge representation, and (c) evaluation of an individual knowledge 
representation (Goldsmith, Johnson, & Acton, 1991). Knowledge elicitation refers to the 
technique used to draw relatedness judgments between pairs of concepts, such us 
similarity ratings, card sorting, or concept mapping. Once the relationship between every 
model component has been determined, this information can be arranged in the form of a 
proximity matrix, in which each cell value corresponds to the relatedness between a 
single pair of concepts. Knowledge representation refers to the technique or scaling 
procedure used to derive an individual’s cognitive structure. A computer program can be 
used to draw a spatial representation of a mental model, in which each node represents a 
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component of the model (e.g., a concept), and a link between nodes has a weighted value 
determined by the distance between the model components.  
 Resultant mental models can then be evaluated in terms of similarity and 
accuracy scores. Similarity is typically used in the context of team research, and refers to 
the extent to which team members share an understanding of the team’s environment 
(see Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010). In contrast, accuracy scores represent 
the extent to which an individual’s mental model approximates an expert model, a 
referent structure that best reflects the ―true‖ structure of the domain (Acton, Johnson, & 
Goldsmith, 1994). Regardless of which mental models are being compared (i.e., team 
members’ mental models or novice versus expert mental models), the metric used to 
represent mental model similarity and accuracy is the same. Previous research has 
established that mental model comparisons using Pathfinder are better than other scaling 
algorithm methods, such as proximity data and multidimensional scaling (Goldsmith & 
Johnson, 1990; Goldsmith et al., 1991). Specifically, Goldsmith and Johnson (1990) 
advocate the use of a metric known as closeness (C) as the best way to operationalize 
similarity between two mental models (e.g., between a novice and an expert mental 
model). C is roughly equal to the ratio of the number of common links between two 
networks divided by the total number of links in both; it varies from 0 to 1 with one 
representing a perfect match between two mental models (Day, Arthur, & Gettman, 
2001; Kraiger, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995). 
 Given that the purpose of this study was to assess the efficacy of mental models 
as predictors of driving outcomes—an individual task—only accuracy scores will be 
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discussed henceforth. Again, accuracy scores reflect a participant’s similarity not to 
other participants, but to a referent structure which is ―some ideal organization that best 
reflects the structure of the domain‖ (Acton, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 1994, p.303). Since 
cognitive structures should become more like this ideal structure as experience in the 
domain increases, a customary practice is to ask an expert (or panel of experts) to 
generate a mental model of the domain, which in turn is used as the point of comparison 
for novices’ mental models. Therefore, accuracy represents the degree of similarity with 
a reference structure, and indicates how closely a specified mental model resembles a 
―true‖ state of the world. Notwithstanding, it is important to recognize that it is possible 
to find SMEs who have ―equally good yet different mental models for any given content 
domain‖ (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2005, p. 39). This 
phenomena, known as equifinality, occurs when alternative mental models are equally 
effective in predicting task performance. For instance, in making a left turn, person A 
may choose to make a full stop at the intersection and wait until the red light changes to 
green, and then beats the oncoming traffic through speed. Under similar circumstances, 
person B may drift slowly after entering the crossroads and make a left turn without 
making intermediate stops (see Bellet et al., 2009; opportunistic vs dynamic regulation 
strategies). Both drivers are equally successful in making left turns, but they have 
different mental models for performing this task. The idea of ―braking‖ and ―left turn‖ 
should be closely related in person A’s mental model (i.e., stop before turning left), 
whereas in case of driver B, ―speed control‖ should be more closely related to ―left turn‖ 
(i.e., slow down as entering a crossroad). Also, it should be noted that the use of the term 
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equifinality does not preclude the use of the term accuracy; it just means that the task 
permits multiple paths to effective performance. 
 Research has shown the usefulness of comparing novice versus expert referent 
structures for the prediction of performance in academic (Davis, Curtis, & Tschetter, 
2003; Goldsmith et al., 1991) and organizational contexts (Davis & Yi, 2004). Simply 
put, as accuracy scores increase individuals tend to perform better. Likewise, several 
studies have shown that C scores change as a function of training. For instance, 
Goldsmith and Johnson (1990) showed that structural assessments of mental models can 
be used to determine how a student’s configural representation of a subject matter 
becomes increasingly similar to an expert model over the course of instruction. Also, 
Kraiger et al. (1995) showed that C scores were positively correlated with performance 
in a tactical decision making task (r = .63), but only for a subgroup who received 
advance organizers (information on task goals and training objectives) prior to training. 
Day et al. (2001) demonstrated that the similarity between trainee’s knowledge structure 
and an expert model was correlated with skill acquisition, skill retention, and transfer. 
Furthermore, they demonstrated that accuracy scores mediated the association between 
GMA, and skill retention and transfer. Finally, Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, 
and Reynolds (2001) showed that mental models were more accurate among higher 
ranking navy personnel, and showed that teamwork mental models were amenable to 
change through a computer-based training intervention (see also Edwards, Day, Arthur, 
& Bell, 2006). 
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3.2 The nature of driving mental models and its relationship with driving outcomes 
 Driving mental models can be defined as representational schemas for driving-
related tasks. Bellet et al. (2009) describe car driving as a dynamic process that requires 
constant adaptation from the driver. According to this view, driver mental models are 
formed under specific circumstances, determined by both the driving situation and the 
needs and intentions of the driver. That is, mental models emerge from an iterative 
perception-action cycle in which an active observer is constantly building models of the 
task in accordance with his/her goals. Once these mental representations are formed, 
they can be stored in long term memory and reactivated in future performance of similar 
tasks. Bellet et al. introduced the term immergence ―to describe the sedimentation 
phenomenon of explicit thought in implicit knowledge‖ (p. 1209). This concept is 
similar to Anderson’s (1993) notion of compilation, in that once a mental representation 
is formed (or emerges) and put into practice repeatedly over time, it becomes an 
automated process that is no longer under the person’s explicit awareness or control—or, 
the mental representation immerges in deep-cognition.  
 A reason for using mental models to assess driving knowledge is the notion that 
expertise in this domain may require not only the acquisition of knowledge, but an 
understanding of the interrelationships between critical driving components, a level of 
comprehension that runs parallel to skill development (Anderson, 1982). An assumption 
of this model is that the linear association between declarative knowledge and driving 
outcomes is not monotonic, such that after a cut-off score has been surpassed the 
correlation between declarative knowledge and driving outcomes would no longer 
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remain statistically significant. In other words, as expertise in this domain develops, 
traditional knowledge tests would not be as sensitive as mental models in discriminating 
between individuals with different levels of proficiency (Kraiger et al., 1993). In support 
of this reasoning, Kraiger et al. (1995) did not find significant differences between 
groups under different experimental conditions when comparisons were made on the 
basis of a multiple-choice declarative knowledge test (because of this measure’s range 
restriction effect). Conversely, they found that experimental and control training groups 
differed significantly in terms of their mental models; a finding which indicates that 
mental models differentiate better at the high end of the performance range.  
 Consonant with the extant body of literature, the following hypothesis were 
tested: 
 Hypothesis 1a: Mental model accuracy will predict at-fault crashes. 
 Hypothesis 1b: Mental model accuracy will predict moving violations. 
 Hypothesis 2a: Mental model accuracy will predict at-fault crashes better than a 
traditional measure of driving knowledge (i.e., a driving 
knowledge test) 
 Hypothesis 2b: Mental model accuracy will predict moving violations better than 
a traditional measure of driving knowledge (i.e., a driving 
knowledge test) 
 Hypothesis 3a: Mental model accuracy will account for variance in crashes over 
and above other commonly used predictors of driving outcomes. 
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 Hypothesis 3b: Mental model accuracy will account for variance in moving 
violations over and above other commonly used predictors of 
driving outcomes. 
 As a second line of inquiry, the relationship between driving mental models and 
other commonly used predictors of driving outcomes was also explored. First, if mental 
models develop as experience accrues, then individuals with more driving experience 
(i.e., more years driving, more miles driven per week) should develop more accurate 
mental models. Also, as pointed out by Bellet et al. (2009), mental models carry 
information about the driver’s value judgments of his/her own driving, which in turn are 
a reflection of his/her personality.
1
 If this later claim is true—that mental models are also 
shaped by driver’s personality—then it follows that people with different personalities 
should also develop different driving mental models. This later claim is consistent with 
Ackerman’s notion of trait complexes, which are non-ability traits that presumably 
facilitate or impede the acquisition of domain knowledge (Ackerman, 2003, 2007; 
Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). Finally, there is evidence that GMA facilitates skill 
acquisition. In this sense, driving mental model accuracy (i.e., a learning outcome) 
should be predicted by GMA. In a previous study, Day et al. (2001) showed that the 
correlation between mental model accuracy and GMA was statistically significant, with 
                                                 
1
 Bellet et al. (2009) refer to this process as reflexivity, which comprises the meta-
cognitions about the behavior performed during driving, and a value judgment 
dimension about one’s acts that accompanies the development of mental representations. 
These meta-cognitions about driving-related behaviors are carried into deep-cognition 
during the immergence process. 
 
24 
a mechanically combined referent structure yielding better results (r = .45, p <.001) than 
a consensus referent structure (r = .29, p <.01).  
 In accordance, the following hypotheses were tested: 
 Hypothesis 4: Driving experience will be positively associated with mental 
model accuracy. 
 Hypothesis 5: Personality variables typically associated with driving outcomes 
(i.e., conscientiousness, extroversion, and agreeableness) will be 
associated with mental model accuracy. 
 Hypothesis 6: GMA will be positively correlated with mental model accuracy. 
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4. METHOD 
4.1 Participants 
 The sample consisted of 130 individuals (52% female) between 17 and 21 years 
old (M = 18.68, SD = 0.80). They were undergraduate students from a southwestern 
university and were recruited as part of a larger study on teams. All measures for the 
present study were collected at different points during a proctored lab session that lasted 
five hours. 
4.2 Measures 
4.2.1 Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) 
 GMA was operationalized as scores on the short form of the APM (Arthur & 
Day, 1994; Arthur, Tubre, Paul, & Sanchez-Ku, 1999) which consists of 2 practice items 
and 12 test items. This measure is regarded as a test with a low level of culture loading, 
and it is considered the purest available measure of fluid intelligence (Raven, 1989, 
2000). Arthur et al. reported a 1–week test-retest reliability of .76 for this measure. 
4.2.2 Driving behavior questionnaire 
 Total crashes and number of tickets were collected via a self-report measure 
(Arthur & Doverspike, 1992). Specifically, participants were asked to list all crashes in 
which they were at-fault and not-at-fault each year since 2005 and up to 2009 (―How 
many At-fault accidents were you in?‖, ―How many not at-fault accidents?‖). They were 
also asked to report the number of tickets or moving violations they had received by year 
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for the same period of time (―How many tickets or moving violations did you receive?‖). 
The same questionnaire was used to collect information about driving experience 
(number of years driving rounded to the nearest year) and number of miles driven per 
week. On average, participants had been driving for 3.02 years (SD = 1.14, min = 1, max 
= 6). Table 1 displays participants’ type of driving license and type of vehicles they 
usually drive. Participants also responded to a question about speed limit abiding. 
Specifically, they were asked ―On average, how many miles per hour under or over the 
speed limit you drive?‖.  
4.2.3 Driving knowledge test 
 Driving knowledge was assessed via an 18–item four-alternative multiple-choice 
test. Items for this test were developed from the Texas Drivers Handbook and reflect 
knowledge required in order to obtain a Texas driver's license. The average number of 
correct responses for this measure was 12.49 (SD = 2.00, min = 6, max = 17). 
4.2.4 Five-factor model 
 Goldberg’s (2006) 50–item measure was used to operationalize the five-factor 
model personality variables—extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability, and openness. Each factor was assessed with 10 Likert-type items, with 
participants rating the extent to which each statement was descriptive of them (1 = very 
inaccurate, 5 = very accurate). Internal consistency estimates for the factors ranged from 
.80 to .89. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Driving Questionnaire 
  N % 
Type of License   
No response
a
 2 1.54 
Class A 7 5.38 
Class B 6 4.62 
Class C 111 85.38 
Class M 4 3.08 
Total 130 100.00 
Type of Vehicle 
  
No response 1 0.77 
Passenger car 49 37.69 
Pick-up truck 26 20.00 
Sport-utility vehicle (SUV) 40 30.77 
Motorcycle 5 3.85 
Van 8 6.15 
Commercial vehicle (e.g., 18–
wheeler, bus) 
1 0.77 
Total 130 100.00 
Note. Class A = for operating vehicles which tow trailers or 
other vehicles over 10,000 pounds; Class B = for operating 
vehicles over 26,001 lbs; Class C = for operating vehicles under 
26,001 lbs. that would normally not require a commercial driver 
license; Class M = for operating motorcycles.  
a 
Although these participants did not provide their license type, 
based on their responses to other questions of the driving 
questionnaire, it was safe to assume that both of them were 
actual drivers. 
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4.2.5 General and specific locus of control 
 Rotter’s (1966) internal-external scale was used to measure general locus of 
control, and was scored such that higher scores reflect an external locus of control and 
lower scores an internal locus. The internal-external scale consisted of 23 pairs of 
statements,
2
 and participants were instructed to select one statement from each pair that 
better reflects their personal beliefs. Previous studies have reported moderate to high 
internal consistency estimates, ranging from .69 to .76 (Rotter, 1966). Coefficient alpha 
for our sample was .67 for general locus of control. 
 Montag and Comrey’s (1987) driving internality and driving externality measure 
was used to operationalize specific locus of control. Each scale (internality and 
externality) consisted of 15 statements and participants were instructed to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed with each statement (1 = disagree very much, 6 = agree very 
much). Although the original measure takes a multi-dimensional approach, we combined 
both scales to yield a single score of specific locus of control, such that higher scores 
reflect an external locus of control and lower scores an internal locus. The coefficient 
alpha for the combined 30-item measure was .77. 
4.2.6 Mental models 
 Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990), a structural-assessment-technique-based 
program, was used for the elicitation, analysis, and comparison of driving mental 
models. The 12 concepts (or terms) used as the model components were extracted from a 
                                                 
2
 The original scale consists of 23 pairs of statement, but because of a technical problem 
we were able to use only the first 18 statements.  
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driving education text book. Participants were asked to make judgments about the 
relatedness of all possible pairs of concepts. They were instructed to think about the 
concepts as they relate to driving safely. Each concept was presented at the center of a 
bull’s eye type diagram and participants were instructed to drag-and-drop the remaining 
11 concepts around a target concept (Figure 1). Relatedness ratings were based on the 
distance between a given concept and the target (0 = less related or unrelated, 4 = 
synonyms). The same procedure was repeated until every concept was positioned as the 
target concept. After relatedness ratings were collected, Pathfinder was used to render 
network structures. Networks were derived using two parameters, r and q, to determine 
how network distance is calculated (r was set to infinity and q was set to equal the 
number of concepts minus one). 
 A measure of internal consistency, known as coherence score, was computed for 
each participant dataset. Coherence scores range from 0 to 1, and are based on the 
assumption that relatedness between a pair of items can be predicted by the relations of 
those items to other items in the set. Low coherence values (< .20) may indicate that 
raters have little or no expertise in the domain, or it may indicate that they did not take 
the task seriously. In order to estimate this measure’s reliability, participants’ mental 
models were assessed on two different occasions with a retest interval of approximately 
40 minutes.  
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Figure 1. Screen capture of a participant’s view of the bull’s eye diagram for arranging 
mental model terms. The focal term (―Fog‖) is at the center of the bull’s eye while the 
remaining terms are being dragged and dropped around the focal term to indicate their 
degree of relatedness (synonyms, extremely related, largely related, moderately related, 
and less related or unrelated [outside the bull’s eye])  
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5.  RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 displays the number of crashes and moving violations reported by study 
participants. Remarkably, 35 participants (26.92%) reported being involved in at least 
one crash in which they were at-fault during the last five years, whereas 28 (21.53%) 
were involved in a car crash in which they were not-at-fault. In comparison to at-fault 
and not-at-fault figures, the percentage of individuals who received at least one ticket 
during the same period of time was somewhat higher (31.53%). 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Crashes and Moving Violations Reported by Study Participants 
  N % 
Total At-fault Crashes 
  0 95 73.08 
1 21 16.15 
2 13 10.00 
4 1 0.77 
Total Not-at-fault Crashes     
0 102 78.46 
1 20 15.38 
2 6 4.62 
3 2 1.54 
Total Moving Violations     
0 89 68.46 
1 24 18.46 
2 11 8.46 
3 4 3.08 
4 1 0.77 
6 1 0.77 
Note. N = 130. Data from 2005 to 2009. 
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 As shown in Table 3, the correlation between sex and at-fault crashes was 
statistically significant, with females having more crashes than males, r = –.18, p <.05. 
The correlation between age and number of tickets was also statistically significant; 
however, age was also positively correlated with driving years and miles driven per 
week, so further analyses were conducted to partial out the effect of both variables 
separately. After controlling for driving years and miles driven per week the association 
between age and moving violations was no longer statistically significant. 
Conscientiousness was associated with at-fault and not-at-fault crashes, as well as 
moving violations, rs between –.17 to –.24.  
5.2 Mental models accuracy scores 
 Accuracy scores were obtained by comparing each participant’s mental model to 
a mechanically combined SME mental model. Five police officers from a mid-size 
municipal police department were recruited to serve as SMEs. All of them were 
currently active police officers with 4 to 25 years-of-service (M = 18.40), with a diverse 
driving training background in areas such as defensive driving, crash investigation, crash 
involvement, crash reconstruction, and traffic enforcement, among others. The same 
procedure described above for collecting participants’ relatedness ratings was followed.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Study Variable Intercorrelations 
 
Criteria Demographic Exposure GMA Knowledge 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. At-fault crashes                         
2. Not-at-fault crashes .29*** 
 
  
  
  
 
    
   3. Tickets .34*** .21*   
  
  
 
    
   4. Sexa –.18* –.08 –.11                   
5. Age .07 .12 .21* .23**                 
6. Driving years .15 .09 .22* .17 .50***   
 
    
   7. Miles per week .17 .07 .35*** .07 .21* .23* 
 
    
   8. Speed .15 .01 .36*** –.17 .08 .00 .17           
9. GMA .07 .20* –.04 .10 .03 .08 .05 .09         
10. Driving knowledge test .04 .03 .05 –.02 –.07 .12 .28** .09 .18* 
   11. Coherence adm. 1 .06 .07 .04 –.05 .05 .04 –.03 .10 –.03 .04
  12. Accuracy adm. 1 –.01 .04 –.16 .09 .00 –.02 –.13 –.07 .31*** .07 .12 
 13. Coherence adm. 2 .06 –.03 –.07 .11 –.01 –.04 –.01 –.01 .04 .16 .31*** –.01 
14. Accuracy adm. 2 .03 –.05 –.18* .01 –.09 –.15 –.03 –.03 .24** .25** –.08 .49*** 
15. Within participant sim .16 .04 –.08 .03 –.02 –.03 .02 .07 .25** .23** .11 .51*** 
16. Within participant corr .08 .08 –.10 –.12 –.12 –.16 –.14 .08 .24** .11 .19* .35*** 
17. Extroversion .16 –.15 .09 –.05 –.01 .11 .02 .11 –.01 .05 .06 –.08 
18. Agreeableness .07 .02 –.05 –.21* –.06 –.06 –.07 –.09 –.05 .07 .14 .00 
19. Conscientiousness –.21* –.17* –.24** –.12 –.15 –.07 –.17 –.01 .16 –.08 .10 .23** 
20. Emotional Stability –.13 –.08 –.10 .25** .04 .04 –.04 –.13 .16 .15 .02 .28** 
21. Openness –.04 .02 –.17 .12 .01 .02 –.12 –.12 .19* .07 –.01 .09 
22. General LoC .03 .13 .05 –.17 –.07 .00 –.02 .10 .04 –.01 –.04 .05 
23. Specific LoC –.06 .03 .05 –.13 –.07 –.07 –.10 –.04 –.06 –.01 .10 –.04 
M 0.39 0.29 0.52 0.49 18.69 3.02  78.57  5.19  8.22 12.49   .20   .17 
SD 0.73 0.63 0.97 0.50 0.80 1.14  109.35  4.24  2.21   2.00   .25   .08 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of control; adm. = administration; sim = similarity; corr = correlation.  
a
Dummy codes for sex are female = 0, and male = 1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
3
3
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Knowledge Personality 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1. At-fault crashes                       
2. Not-at-fault crashes   
    
  
     3. Tickets   
    
  
     4. Sex                       
5. Age                       
6. Driving years   
    
  
     7. Miles per week   
    
  
     8. Speed                       
9. GMA                       
10. Driving knowledge test   
    
  
     11. Coherence adm. 1   
    
  
     12. Accuracy adm. 1   
    
  
     13. Coherence adm. 2   
    
  
     14. Accuracy adm. 2 .09 
    
  
     15. Within participant sim .13 .57*** 
   
  
     16. Within participant corr .22* .38*** .65*** 
  
  
     17. Extroversion .03 .02 .06 .02 
 
  
     18. Agreeableness .16 –.06 –.05 .08 .34***   
     19. Conscientiousness .03 .05 –.03 .04 –.06 .04 
     20. Emotional Stability .05 .21* .16 .15 .07 .10 .08 
    21. Openness .02 .07 .15 .09 .29*** .22* .03 .15 
   22. General LoC –.06 –.06 –.06 .05 –.10 –.07 –.08 –.26** .02 
  23. Specific LoC .00 –.14 .00 .08 –.02 .07 –.06 –.20* .05 .23** 
 M .19 .17 .24 .44 34.24 38.98 34.75 32.05 36.59 8.51 3.45 
SD .29 .09 .15 .22  7.18  5.39  5.81  6.93  5.30 3.18 0.43 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of control; adm. = administration; sim = similarity; corr = correlation.  
a
Dummy codes for sex are female = 0, and male = 1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 3
2
 
3
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 Except for SME 1, all SMEs’ mental models had coherence scores over the .20 
cutoff point (Table 4). Along with the low coherence score, SME 1 had the largest 
number of links between nodes (42) which can be an indicator of low ability to 
discriminate among concepts. Network similarity between SMEs was assessed using C 
scores.
3
 Most C scores obtained were statistically significant (p < .05), which means that 
the number of links in common between a pair of networks is greater than what it would 
be expected by chance.  
 
 
 
Table 4 
Coherence Scores and Number of Links of Each SME Mental Model, and Two Measures 
of Between-SME Mental Model Similarity (Number of Common Links and C Scores)  
  Coherence SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4 SME 5 
SME 1 -.02 (42) 31 22 29 22 
SME 2 .26 .29** (34) 20 25 16 
SME 3 .28 .15** .21** (26) 20 12 
SME 4 .53 .17** .19** .18** (36) 16 
SME 5 .27 .22** .13** .09 .10 (23) 
Note. SME = Subject matter expert. Coherence scores lower than .20 indicate that 
mental model is not coherent. The number of links of each SME mental model are 
displayed in parenthesis. Number of common links and C scores are displayed above and 
below the diagonal respectively. t-tests are based on corrected similarity scores with       
p < .05 indicating that networks are similar. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 In order to identify the best referent structure, every combination of SME’s 
mental models was analyzed and compared—an average mental model of all four 
SME’s, as well as average network of every possible group of two and three SMEs’ 
mental models. The mean coherence score of every combination taken together was .30 
                                                 
3
 In the Pathfinder program referred to as corrected similarity scores. 
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(SD = .16). The mean coherence scores for groups of two SME mental models (Mc = 
.41, N = 6) was higher than groups of three SME mental models (Mc = .16, N = 4), and 
somewhat higher than the combined network of all SMEs together (C = .34).  
 As it can be seen in Table 5, the correlation between mental model accuracy 
measured at Administration 1 and 2 and at-fault crashes did not yield any statistically 
significant relationships. For not-at-fault crashes there are several significant correlations 
but in the opposite direction, that is, high mental model accuracy was associated with 
relatively high not-at-fault crashes rate. The correlations between mental model accuracy 
and moving violations are generally low but they tend to increase as the number of 
SMEs increases, that is, when an additional SME mental model is added to the referent 
structure the correlation with criteria is improved (from .02 to –.14, excluding a 
combined network of all four SMEs wherein the correlation with criteria drops to –.04). 
At the same time, changing the number of SMEs for creating the mechanically combined 
referent structures also impacts coherence scores. At first, coherence scores improve, on 
average, from .27 (SD = .20) to .41 (SD =.07); but then, when a third network was added 
to the referent structure, the average coherence score drops to .16 (SD = .15). 
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Table 5 
Different Individual and Mechanically Combined SMEs Mental Models Properties and Their Correlations to Criterion 
Variables 
        Administration 1   Administration 2 
SME Coherence Number of 
links 
  At-fault 
crashes 
Not-at-fault 
crashes 
Moving 
violations 
  At-fault 
crashes 
Not-at-fault 
crashes 
Moving 
violations 
SME 1 –.02 42 
 
–.06   .19* –.06 
 
.03 .13 –.07 
SME 2 .26 34 
 
–.05 .18* –.14 
 
.13 .15 –.04 
SME 3 .28 26 
 
–.06 –.02 –.06 
 
.08 .12 .17 
SME 4 .53 36 
 
.01   .22* –.01 
 
.14 .13 .08 
SME 5 .27 23 
 
.03 .03 –.13 
 
–.02 –.02 –.14 
Mean .34 32.20   –.03 .12 –.08   .07 .10 .00 
SD .20 7.69   .04 .11 .06   .07 .07 .12 
SME 23 .34 19 
 
–.06 .06 –.08 
 
.06 .10 .09 
SME 24 .46 24 
 
–.02 .21* –.09 
 
.07 .08 .02 
SME 25 .40 19 
 
–.01 .04 –.16 
 
.03 –.05 –.18* 
SME 34 .51 19 
 
.02 .14 .06 
 
–.09 –.04 –.16 
SME 35 .33 15 
 
–.02 .20* –.03 
 
–.09 .06 .00 
SME 45 .41 15 
 
.02 .14 –.08 
 
–.07 .02 –.12 
Mean .41 18.50   –.01 .13 –.06   –.01 .03 –.06 
SD .07 3.33   .03 .07 .07   .08 .06 .11 
SME 234 .16 26 
 
.04 .08 –.02 
 
.00 –.03 –.13 
SME 235 .37 25 
 
–.04 .18* –.08 
 
–.02 .11 –.12 
SME 245 .01 26 
 
.03 .19* .04 
 
–.01 .14 –.10 
SME 345 .10 25 
 
.06 .01 .09 
 
–.09 –.09 –.22* 
Mean .16 25.50   .02 .11 .01   –.03 .03 –.14 
SD .15 0.58   .05 .09 .07   .04 .11 .05 
SME 2345 .34 19 
 
.00 .21* –.01 
 
.02 .09 –.04 
Total mean .30 24.56   –.01 .13 –.05   .01 .06 –.06 
SD .16 7.48   .04 .08 .07   .07 .08 .11 
Note. A combined mental model of all five SME is not provided because the mental model of one of them (SME 1) did not meet the .20 cut-off score 
for coherence. *p <. 05, two tailed. N = 130.  
 
 
3
7
 
38 
 Because the similarity between SMEs’s mental models was not perfect (see 
Table 4) aggregating them to create a referent structure may introduce some 
inconsistencies that may negatively impact coherence scores. It is possible that this set of 
experts hold accurate mental models of driving safely but are also inconsistent between 
each other. If this is the case, then adding them up would create a distorted picture of the 
domain. At the same time, adding more expert knowledge to the model should provide a 
broader picture of the content domain which may translate into better predictor-criterion 
correlations. The fact that higher predictor-criterion estimates were obtained for referent 
structures based on combined SME mental models in comparison to estimates obtained 
from individually based reference structures seems to support this later claim. Low 
coherence scores may be just an undesired ―side effect‖ of expanding the knowledge 
domain.  
 Only a combined network of SMEs 2 and 5 (henceforth SME25), and a 
combined network of SMEs 3, 4, and 5 (henceforth SME345) displayed statistically 
significant correlations with criteria in the expected direction. However, the referent 
structure SME25 will be used to test the main hypotheses of this study instead of 
SME345 based on the following reasoning. First, SME345 is not coherent (C = .10). 
Although coherence is not correlated with a referent structure’s ability to predict crashes 
and moving violations (see Table 6), having an incoherent network as referent structure 
makes the results more difficult to interpret. For instance, highly accurate mental model 
may also be highly incoherent mental models. 
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Table 6 
Correlations Between All Referent Structures Psychometric  
Properties and Driving Outcomes 
  Coherence Number of 
links 
Administration 1   
At-fault crashes –.06 –.28 
Not-at-fault crashes .14 .22 
Moving violations –.21 –.03 
Administration 2 
  
At-fault crashes .14 .58* 
Not-at-fault crashes –.09 .48 
Moving violations .24 .18 
Note. *p < .05, two-tailed. N = 16. These results should be 
interpreted with caution because some combined SME 
mental models share raters. 
 
 Second, SME345 had a larger number of links which may indicate less 
differentiation between concepts. (At the same time, as shown in Table 6, a higher 
number of concepts was associated with higher crash rate at Administration 2.) Lastly, 
SME3 mental model was associated with moving violations in the opposite direction 
whereas, individually, both SME2 and SME5 mental models were associated with 
moving violations in the expected direction (although neither of these correlations were 
statistically significant).  
 Since the primary focus of this study was to predict driving-related criteria, an 
average network of SME2 and SME5 (Figure 2) was used as the referent structure to 
derive participant’s mental model accuracy because it provided the highest predictor-
criterion correlation in comparison to averaged networks with similar coherence scores 
and number of links.  
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Figure 2. Mental model based on SME2 and SME5 (19 links, C = .40) 
5.3 Mental models reliability estimates 
 Participants’ mean coherence score was .20 (SD = .25) at Administration 1, and 
.19 (SD = .29) at Administration 2. The correlation between mental model coherence 
scores at Administration 1 and 2 was positive and statistically significant, r = .31, p <. 
01. At the same time, using the .20 cut-off score, 59% of the participants displayed 
equally coherent (or equally incoherent) mental models between administrations.   
 Mental model accuracy score correlations, within participant correlation, and 
within participant similarity were calculated as a means of assessing mental model 
measurement stability. The correlation between mental model accuracy scores at 
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Administration 1 and Administration 2 was .49, p < .001. Mean within participant 
correlation was .44 (SD = .22) whereas mean within participant similarity (i.e., the 
degree of similarity between an individual’s mental models obtained in two occasions) 
was .24 (SD = .15). Pathfinder offers a way for assessing mental model similarity using a 
t-test in which p values lower than .05 indicate that two networks share more common 
links than what would be expected by chance. The later analysis showed that 82.3% of 
the sample generated similar mental models between administrations. 
 Although the within participant correlation was low relative to test-retest 
reliability standards, within participant similarity considered as a dichotomous variable 
suggests the opposite (82.3% of the respondents provided consistent mental models). A 
similar pattern of results were obtained for the coherence scores; while the correlation 
between coherence scores measured at Administration 1 and 2 was relatively low (r = 
.31, p <. 01), 59% of the participants displayed equally coherent (or equally incoherent) 
mental models between administrations. These results suggest that mental model 
reliability estimates may depend on the conceptualization of the underlying latent 
construct. Although theory posits that differences in declarative knowledge are more 
quantitative in nature whereas differences in knowledge organization are more 
qualitative, there is no reason why knowledge organization (or reorganization) could not 
occur incrementally in the case of driving (cf. Dayton, Durso, & Shepard, 1990). That is, 
individuals repeatedly exposed to the same task should form new links between different 
aspects of the task that should be reflected in increasingly better (or possibly worse) 
mental models. Consequently, mental model coherence and accuracy scores were 
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conceptualized as continuous variables—because the acquisition of driving knowledge 
can be thought of as an incremental rather than an all-or-none learning process—and all 
analyses are based on this assumption, including the interpretation of the preceding 
reliability estimates.  
5.4 Contrast of main hypotheses of the study  
 In support of Hypothesis 1b, mental model accuracy measured at Administration 
2 was negatively correlated with tickets (r = –.18, p < .05) which means that lower 
mental model accuracy was associated with higher rate of moving violations. Moreover, 
because declarative knowledge—as measured by the driving knowledge test—was not 
correlated with either criteria, these initial results also support Hypothesis 2b. 
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b stated that mental model accuracy would predict a 
significant amount of variance over commonly used predictors of driving outcomes. To 
test these hypotheses, a series of hierarchical analyses were conducted to compare the 
contribution of each variable to the prediction of crashes and tickets. First, each variable 
was entered in the model according to its absolute correlation to at-fault crashes (Table 
7); then, the same procedure was followed using moving violations as the criterion 
(Table 8).  
 As shown in Table 7, conscientiousness and sex were related to at-fault crashes. 
Specifically, low conscientious individuals reported having been involved in more 
crashes than high conscientious individuals, and females had more crashes than males. 
 .  
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting At-fault Crashes 
Predictor β R2 ΔR2 
1. Conscientiousness –0.25 .04* 
 
2. Sex
a
 –0.24 .09** .04* 
3. Miles per week 0.12 .11** .02 
4. Extroversion 0.14 .13** .02 
5. Speed 0.15 .15** .02 
6. Driving years –0.13 .15** .01 
7. Emotional Stability –0.02 .15** .00 
8. Age 0.02 .15** .00 
9. Agreeableness 0.12 .16** .01 
10. GMA –0.09 .17** .01 
11. Specific LoC 0.09 .18** .01 
12. Coherence adm. 2 0.04 .18* .00 
13. Coherence adm. 1 –0.04 .19* .00 
14. Openness –0.07 .19* .00 
15. Driving test –0.02 .19* .00 
16. General LoC 0.03 .19* .00 
17. Accuracy adm. 2 0.08 .20 .00 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of 
control; adm. = administration. aDummy codes for sex are female = 
0, and male = 1. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
With moving violations as the criterion, miles driven per week, conscientiousness, and 
sex predicted a significant amount of variance in number of tickets. Therefore, the 
results presented in Tables 7 and 8 do not support either Hypothesis 3a or Hypothesis 3b. 
Specifically, no evidence of incremental validity for mental model accuracy was found 
when assessed in conjunction with conscientiousness and sex for predicting at-fault 
crashes, or when assessed in conjunction with miles driven per week, conscientiousness, 
and sex for predicting moving violations. 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Moving Violations 
Predictor β R2 ΔR2 
1. Miles per week .27 .12*** 
 
2. Conscientiousness –.18 .15*** .03** 
3. Driving years .08 .17*** .02 
4. Age .11 .18*** .00 
5. Accuracy adm. 2 –.14 .20*** .02 
6. Openness –.13 .21*** .01 
7. Accuracy adm. 1 .01 .21*** .00 
8. Sex
a
 –.17 .24*** .03* 
9. Emotional Stability .02 .24*** .00 
10. Extroversion .12 .25*** .01 
11. Coherence adm. 2 –.03 .25*** .00 
12. Driving test .00 .25*** .00 
13. General LoC .02 .25*** .00 
14. Specific LoC .05 .25*** .00 
15. Agreeableness –.07 .26*** .00 
16. GMA .04 .26*** .00 
17. Coherence adm. 1 .04 .26*** .00 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of 
control; adm. = administration. aDummy codes for sex are female = 0, 
and male = 1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 To further investigate this Hypotheses 3a and 3b, a series of regressions were 
used to compare the effect of mental model accuracy over and beyond individual 
predictors of driving outcomes, specifically against those predictors that demonstrated 
statistically significant correlations with driving outcomes in this study sample (Table 9). 
These analyses showed that mental model accuracy predicted a significant amount of 
variance in moving violations after partialling out the effects of miles driven per week, 
and conscientiousness. (Note that ΔR2 for predicting moving violations after controlling 
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for sex was not interpreted because sex was not correlated with moving violations.) No 
evidence of incremental variance in predicting at-fault crashes was found. 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Mental Model Accuracy Effectiveness for Predicting Crashes and Moving Violations 
Over and Above Individual Predictors of Driving Outcomes 
    At-fault crashes   Moving violations 
Predictor 
 
R
2
 ΔR2 
 
R
2
 ΔR2 
Model 1 
      Sex
a
 
 
.03* 
  
.01 
 Accuracy adm. 2 
 
.03 .00 
 
.04 .03* 
Model 2 
 
  
   Age 
 
.00  
 
.04* 
 Accuracy adm. 2 
 
.01 .00 
 
.07* .03 
Model 3 
 
  
   Driving years 
 
.02  .05* 
Accuracy adm. 2 
 
.02 .00  .07* .02 
Model 4 
 
     
Miles per week 
 
.03   .12***  
Accuracy adm. 2 
 
.03 .00  .15*** .03* 
Model 5 
 
     
Conscientiousness 
 
.04*   .06***  
Accuracy adm. 2 
 
.05 .00   .08*** .03* 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of control; 
adm. = administration. aDummy codes for sex are female = 0, and male = 1. *p 
< .05. **p < .01. **p < .001. 
 
 It was hypothesized that driving experience and personality variables typically 
associated with driving outcomes would correlate with mental model accuracy 
(Hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively). The correlations between driving years and mental 
model accuracy at Administration 1 and 2 were not statistically significant (Table 3). In 
contrast, conscientiousness and emotional stability were positively correlated with 
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mental model accuracy at Administration 1, r = .23, p < .01, and r = .28, p < .01. 
However, only emotional stability was also correlated with mental model accuracy at 
Administration 2, r = .21, p < .05. Finally, in support of Hypothesis 6, GMA was 
positively correlated with mental model accuracy at Administration 1, r = .31, p < .001, 
and Administration 2 (r = .24, p < .001). 
 To gain a better understanding of the relationship between driving mental models 
and other predictors of driving outcomes, a hierarchical regression analysis was 
conducted using mental model accuracy as the criterion. Results of these analyses are 
displayed in Table 10. The best predictor of mental model accuracy was declarative 
knowledge as measured by the driving knowledge test; however this correlation was 
significant for Administration 2 but not for Administration 1. After controlling for 
declarative knowledge, GMA and driving years were the best predictors of mental model 
accuracy. Although emotional stability was positively correlated with mental model 
accuracy at both Administration 1 and 2, this correlation was no longer statistically 
significant after controlling simultaneously for GMA and driving years. 
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Table 10 
Hierarchical Regression Predicting Mental Model Accuracy From  
Other Predictors of Driving Outcomes 
Predictor β R2 ΔR2 
1. Driving test .25 .06**  
2. GMA .18 .10** .04* 
3. Emotional Stability .14 .12*** .02 
4. Driving years –.22 .16*** .04* 
5. Specific LoC –.11 .18*** .01 
6. Age .04 .18*** .00 
7. Openness .01 .18** .00 
8. Agreeableness –.12 .18** .01 
9. General LoC –.01 .18** .00 
10. Conscientiousness .00 .18** .00 
11. Miles driven per week –.08 .19** .00 
12. Extroversion .06 .19* .00 
13. Sex
a
 –.04 .19* .00 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; LoC = locus of 
control. aDummy codes for sex are female = 0, and male = 1. *p < .05. 
**p < .01. **p < .001.  
 
 However, when controlling for GMA and driving years separately and 
individually, the association between emotional stability and mental model accuracy was 
positive and statistically significant (Table 11). In other words, high emotional stability 
individuals provided more accurate mental models.  
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Table 11 
Emotional Stability as a Predictor of Mental Model  
Accuracy Over GMA and Declarative Knowledge 
    Accuracy Adm. 2 
Predictor 
 
R
2
 ΔR2 
Model 1 
   GMA 
 
.06** 
 Emotional 
stability 
 
.09** .03* 
Model 2 
 
  
Driving 
knowledge test 
 
.06**  
Emotional 
stability 
 
.09* .03* 
Note. N = 130. GMA = general mental ability; adm. 
= administration. *p < .05. **p < .01. **p < .001. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
 Several predictors were used to predict crashes and moving violations. Consistent 
with prior research in this domain, demographic, exposure variables, and 
conscientiousness, were good individual predictors of crashes and moving violations. 
Other associations between personality variables typically used in this domain—such as 
agreeableness, and extraversion (cf. Clarke & Robertson, 2005)—were not correlated 
with criteria.  
 As hypothesized, mental model accuracy was better at predicting driving 
outcomes in comparison to a traditional driving knowledge test. This study also provided 
support for mental models as a predictor of driving outcomes over and beyond the effect 
of a few statistically significant predictors (i.e., miles driven per week and 
conscientiousness). Given that conscientiousness and mental models were the only 
statistically significant predictors of driving outcomes from the psychological domain, 
the generalizability of these findings may be questioned. For instance, previous studies 
have found that agreeableness and extroversion are associated with driving outcomes 
(Clarke & Robertson, 2005); however, the validity of these predictors was not replicated 
in the context of this study. Thus, it would be improper to conclude that, in general, 
mental models add incremental validity to previously established predictors of driving 
outcomes. The problem with replicating some previous findings may be due to the 
current study’s limited sample. Consequently, using a more representative sample of the 
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population of drivers is strongly recommended in future studies (e.g., this sample’s age 
ranged from 17 to 21 years).  
 Contrary to Hypotheses 4 and 5 expectations, neither driving years nor 
personality variables typically associated with driving outcomes were correlated with 
mental model accuracy. One exception was emotional stability, which was correlated 
with mental model accuracy at both Administration 1 and 2. Hansen (1989) pointed to a 
mechanism linking emotional stability and crashes via attention to the task. This 
hypothesis states that individuals low in emotional stability may be more sensitive to 
stressors which, in turn, may divert their attention and deplete cognitive resources for 
completing the task at hand. Therefore, although emotional stability did not predict 
crashes or moving violations, the distractibility hypothesis would suggest that low 
emotionally stable individuals would be more prone to make errors when completing a 
task that is cognitively demanding, such as the mental model production task that was 
used for collecting driving mental models. (As it will be argued later, several factors 
including GMA may influence mental model measurement reliability.) 
 Some methodological issues about the measurement of mental models and the 
choice of the most appropriate referent structure were also addressed. First, mean within 
participant similarity (MC = .24, SD = .15) and mean within participant mental model 
correlations (Mr = .44, SD = .22) were relatively low, which indicates low test-retest 
reliability. Also, whereas mean coherence scores were almost the same for 
Administration 1 (Mcoh = .20, SD = .25) and Administration 2 (Mcoh = .19, SD = .29), the 
correlation between coherence scores between administrations was only moderate (r = 
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.31, p < .001). These results indicate that mental model measures were only moderately 
reliable, and further research is needed in order to understand if this is a sample specific 
issue or a larger issue within mental models that may be causing this phenomenon. 
Notwithstanding, since validity is typically reduced by predictor unreliability, it is 
plausible that the correlation between mental models and driving outcomes should 
improve along with more reliable mental model assessments. 
 There were statistically significant correlations between within participant mental 
model similarity and GMA, and to driving knowledge test scores. The fact that GMA 
was associated with an individual’s capacity to provide consistent mental models, may 
be due in part to the novelty of this task (it is unusual for individuals to complete 
pairwise comparisons). If this is the case, researchers should pay special attention to the 
instructions they give participants to complete this task. This may involve such actions 
as simply asking them if they have fully understood the instructions, or providing 
practice items and checking the accuracy of their responses before proceeding with the 
actual test.  
 There is yet another recommendation that stems from the way in which the task 
is presented. For this study each focal concept was presented at the center of a bull’s eye 
type diagram and participants were instructed to drag-and-drop the remaining concepts 
around this target. Although several terms can be arranged around the focal concept at 
once, Pathfinder will only record the distance between a term and the focal concept and 
will not record information about the relatedness between terms other than the focal 
concept. Therefore, if a participant mistakenly arranges the terms based on their 
52 
relatedness with the target and between each other he/she might provide information 
different that the information he/she would have provided if only pairwise comparisons 
were presented. If this is the case, error variance due to the method used for collecting 
pairwise comparison scores may influence mental model reliability, validity, or both. At 
the same time, thinking of these concepts simultaneously may be more challenging than 
thinking about their relatedness one at a time. Using a simpler task for collecting 
pairwise comparisons (e.g., a slide bar between concepts) may reduce the impact of 
GMA on mental model reliability. 
 Driving knowledge test scores were positively correlated with mental model 
accuracy (r = .25, p < .01). This result indicates that mental models, although associated 
with declarative knowledge, are substantially different from it. Also, because declarative 
knowledge was positively correlated with within participant mental model similarity (r = 
.23, p < .01) mental model reliability may also depend on an individual’s previous 
knowledge of the domain. In other words, variance in declarative knowledge may be 
associated with variance in mental model reliability, such that individuals deficient in 
declarative knowledge may experience difficulties in providing consistent mental 
models. This idea is consistent with Anderson’s (1982) stages of skill acquisition, 
wherein declarative knowledge precedes procedural knowledge—which is the aspect of 
knowledge that mental models are purportedly measuring. 
 Selecting terms for generating mental models is undoubtedly a critical aspect of 
mental model measurement. For this study a literature-review-based approach was 
implemented for inferring what was the most appropriate set of terms for this measure. 
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Basically, the themes extracted from the driving education textbook were translated into 
one word or short phrase to represent the content domain. Although this procedure may 
not be optimal, all the terms were considered important by the SMEs.
4
 Needless to say, 
the ability of the researchers to determine what terms are more important was partly due 
to their own driving experience. For other tasks (e.g., landing a large commercial 
jetliner) it would have been impossible to come up with equally relevant terms. As of 
now, a second study is being conducted in which a number of transportation experts are 
providing input on what categories of tasks are most relevant for predicting driving 
outcomes. This later approach (i.e., in-depth task analysis using SMEs) seems more 
adequate for inferring what the most appropriate set of mental model terms is, although 
the superiority of this process (e.g., for improving criterion-related validity) is yet to be 
empirically demonstrated. 
 It was previously mentioned that coherence scores are not necessarily good 
indicators of mental model internal consistency. In fact, like accuracy scores, it is argued 
that coherence scores should be better conceptualized as an index of an individual’s 
mastery of the knowledge domain. Finally, because both accuracy scores and coherence 
scores displayed higher correlations with declarative knowledge for Administration 2, it 
is possible that coherence scores may be also influenced by an individual’s ability to 
understand the pairwise comparison task. 
 A related issue is the lack of explicit guidelines for choosing the best referent 
structure to derive mental model accuracy scores. For the purpose of the present study, 
                                                 
4
 SMEs were required to rate the importance of the terms using a scale from 1 to 5. The 
mean importance rating for the terms ranged between 3.20 to 5.00. 
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the best referent structure was chosen because of its high correlation with criteria; 
nonetheless, this referent structure was different from the one that would have been 
chosen based on mental model properties such as coherence scores and number of links. 
For instance, the best referent structure in terms of coherence score (C = .51) and 
number of links (N = 19) was SME34 (see Tables 4 and 5). The second best referent 
mental model was the one that was actually used for deriving accuracy scores, namely, 
SME25. Interestingly, an averaged network of SMEs 2, 3, 4, and 5, did not improve the 
criterion-related validity of mental model accuracy scores. In sum, the best or ―ideal‖ 
referent structure was not the best predictive referent mental model for the purposes of 
this study.  
 To our knowledge, there are no clear guidelines on how to combine expert 
mental models to derive one single referent structure. This issue is particularly important 
when (a) experts’ mental models are uncorrelated, and (b) when combinations of expert 
mental models yield varying, yet acceptable, coherence scores. On one hand, if expert 
mental models are perfectly correlated, any one can be used as a referent structure 
separately and individually. On the other hand, if they are uncorrelated, a combination of 
them may decrease their individual validity. Results of the present study suggest that a 
combination of expert mental models may capture the criterion space more accurately, 
with each independent expert contribution improving our understanding of the domain. 
In fact, when adding SMEs, the criterion-related validity of mental models also 
increased (although at the expense of mental model coherence). Needless to say, 
deciding who is an expert and why is also critical. As in job analysis, past performance 
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and/or reputation may be used for selecting SMEs, but their ability to convey relevant 
and articulated information about what they do, should also be taken into account.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 Driving mental models’ incremental validity was supported, although the 
variance explained by mental model accuracy was relatively small and was moderated 
by the criteria used to operationalize driving outcomes (i.e., at-fault crashes versus 
moving violations). Declarative knowledge and GMA were positively correlated with 
mental model accuracy, which indicates that they may play an important role as 
antecedents of mental model development. One of the Big Five personality factors 
consistently associated with mental model accuracy was emotional stability—such that 
high emotionally stable participants provided more accurate mental models at 
Administration 1 and Administration 2. 
 The temporal stability of mental models was low either when assessed using 
within participants mental model accuracy (r = .49, p < .001), within participants mental 
model similarity (MC = .24, SD = .15) or within participant mental model correlations 
(Mr = .44, SD = .22). The low test-retest reliability of this measure may be due to 
difficulties inherent to mental model measurement procedure. Two recommendations for 
reducing unreliable mental models variance are (a) to provide clear instructions to 
participants as well as practice items before taking the test; and (b) to reduce the 
complexity of the task by presenting isolated pairs of items instead of the bull’s eye 
diagram in which all the concepts are presented simultaneously. 
 It is argued that previous experience of test developers with the knowledge 
domain should not replace expert judgments, and steps should be taken to ensure that the 
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knowledge domain is sufficiently and accurately represented. Selecting mental model 
terms and identifying an appropriate referent structure for deriving mental model 
accuracy scores are critical steps, and further research is needed to address these issues. 
  
58 
REFERENCES 
 
Ackerman, P. L. (1988). Determinants of individual differences during skill acquisition: 
Cognitive abilities and information processing. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 117, 288-318. 
Ackerman, P. L. (2003). Aptitude complexes and trait complexes. Educational 
Psychologist, 38, 85-93. 
Ackerman, P. L. (2007). New developments in understanding skilled performance. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 235-239. 
Ackerman, P. L., & Heggestad, E. D. (1997). Intelligence, personality, and interests: 
Evidence for overlapping traits. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 219-245. 
Acton, W. H., Johnson, P. J., & Goldsmith, T. E. (1994). Structural knowledge 
assessment: Comparison of referent structures. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 86, 303-311. 
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skill. Psychological Review, 89, 369-
406. 
Anderson, J. R. (1993). Rules of the mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,. 
Arthur, W. Jr., Barret, G. V., & Alexander, R. A. (1991). Prediction of vehicular 
accident involvement: A meta-analysis. Human Performance, 4, 89-105. 
Arthur, W. Jr., Barrett, G. V., & Doverspike, D. (1990). Validation of an information-
processing-based test battery for the prediction of handling accidents among 
59 
petroleum-product transport drivers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 621-
628. 
Arthur, W. Jr., & Day, D. V. (1994). Development of a short form for the Raven 
Advanced Progressive Matrices test. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 54, 394-403. 
Arthur, W. Jr., & Doverspike, D. (1992). Locus of control and auditory selective 
attention as predictors of driving accident involvement: A comparative 
longitudinal investigation. Journal of Safety Research, 23, 73-80. 
Arthur, W. Jr., & Doverspike, D. (2001). Predicting motor vehicle crash involvement 
from a personality measure and a driving knowledge test. Journal of Prevention 
& Intervention in the Community, 22, 35-42. 
Arthur, W. Jr., Fuentes, R., & Doverspike, D. (1990). Relationships among personnel 
tests, age, and job performance. Experimental Aging Research, 16, 11-16. 
Arthur, W. Jr., & Graziano, W. G. (1996). The five-factor model, conscientiousness, and 
driving accident involvement. Journal of Personality, 64, 593-618. 
Arthur, W. Jr., Tubre, T. C., Paul, D. S., & Sanchez-Ku, M. L. (1999). College-sample 
psychometric and normative data on a short form of the Raven Advanced 
Progressive Matrices Test. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 17, 354-
361. 
Arthur, W. Jr., & Day, E. A. (2009). Information processing, personality, and 
demographic variables as predictors of crashes and moving violations. In H. 
60 
Bédard & G. Delashmit (Eds.), Accidents: Causes, analysis, and prevention (pp. 
125-148). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job 
performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 111-118. 
Bellet, T., Bailly-Asuni, B., Mayenobe, P., & Banet, A. (2009). A theoretical and 
methodological framework for studying and modelling drivers' mental 
representations. Safety Science, 47, 1205-1221. 
Bogg, T., & Roberts, B. W. (2004). Conscientiousness and health-related behaviors: A 
meta-analysis of the leading behavioral contributors to mortality. Psychological 
Bulletin, 130, 887-919. 
Clarke, S., & Robertson, I. T. (2005). A meta-analytic review of the Big Five personality 
factors and accident involvement in occupational and non-occupational settings. 
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 78, 355-376. 
Davis, F. D., & Yi, M. Y. (2004). Improving computer skill training: Behavior 
modeling, symbolic mental rehearsal, and the role of knowledge structures. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 509-523. 
Davis, M. A., Curtis, M. B., & Tschetter, J. D. (2003). Evaluating cognitive training 
outcomes: Validity and Utility of structural knowledge assessment. Journal of 
Business and Psychology, 18, 191-206. 
Day, E. A., Arthur, W. Jr., & Gettman, D. (2001). Knowledge structures and the 
acquisition of a complex skill. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 1022-1033. 
61 
Dayton, T., Durso, F. T., & Shepard, J. D. (1990). A measure of knowledge 
reorganization underlying insight. In R. W. Schvaneveldt (Ed.), Pathfinder 
associative networks: Studies in knowledge organization (pp. 267-277). 
Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Edwards, B. D., Day, E. A., Arthur, W. Jr., & Bell, S. T. (2006). Relationships among 
team ability composition, team mental models, and team performance. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 91, 727-736. 
Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C. 
R., et al. (2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-
domain personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 84-96. 
Goldsmith, T. E., & Johnson, P. J. (1990). A structural assessment of classroom 
learning. In R. W. Schvaneveldt (Ed.), Pathfinder associative networks: Studies 
in knowledge organization (pp. 241-254). New Jersey: Ablex. 
Goldsmith, T. E., Johnson, P. J., & Acton, W. H. (1991). Assessing structural 
knowledge. Journal of Educational Psychology, 83, 88-96. 
Gulliver, P., & Begg, D. (2007). Personality factors as predictors of persistent risky 
driving behavior and crash involvement among young adults. Injury Prevention, 
13, 376-381. 
Hansen, C. P. (1989). A causal model of the relationship among accidents, biodata, 
personality, and cognitive factors. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 81-90. 
62 
Horrey, W. J., & Wickens, C. D. (2006). Examining the impact of cell phone 
conversations on driving using meta-analytic techniques. Human Factors, 48, 
196-205. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models (6th ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Jonah, B. A. (1997). Sensation seeking and risky driving. In T. Rothengatter & E. 
Carbonell (Eds.), Traffic and transport psychology (pp. 259-267). Oxford: 
Pergamon. 
Koelega, H. S. (1992). Extraversion and vigilance performance: 30 years of 
inconsistencies. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 239-258. 
Kraiger, K., Ford, J. K., & Salas, E. (1993). Application of cognitive, skill-based, and 
affective theories of learning outcomes to new methods of training evaluation. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 311-328. 
Kraiger, K., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (1995). Measuring knowledge 
organization as a method for assessing learning during training. Human Factors, 
37, 804-816. 
Lievens, F., De Corte, W., & Schollaert, E. (2008). A closer look at the frame-of-
reference effect in personality scale scores and validity. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 93, 268-279. 
Lubinski, D. (2000). Scientific and social significance of assessing individual 
differences: "Sinking shafts at a few critical points.". Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51, 405-444. 
63 
Mathieu, J. E., Heffner, T. S., Goodwin, G. F., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. 
(2005). Scaling the quality of teammates' mental models: Equifinality and 
normative comparisons. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 37-56. 
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality 
across instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52, 81-90. 
Mohammed, S., Ferzandi, L., & Hamilton, K. (2010). Metaphor no more: A 15-year 
review of the team mental model construct. Journal of Management, 36, 876-
910. 
Montag, I., & Comrey, A. L. (1987). Internality and externality as correlates of 
involvement in fatal driving accidents. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 339-
343. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis. (2009a). 2008 Traffic safety annual assessment highlights 
(DOT HS 811 172). Retrieved from http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811172.pdf. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis. (2009b). Traffic safety facts: 2008 Data (DOT HS 811 
162). Retrieved from http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811162.pdf. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis. (2009c). Driver electronic device use in 2008 (DOT HS 
811 184). Retrieved from http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811184.pdf. 
64 
Qiang, W., Bowling, N. A., & Eschleman, K. J. (2010). A meta-analytic examination of 
work and general locus of control. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 761-768. 
Raven, J. (1989). The Raven Progressive Matrices: A review of national norming studies 
and ethnic and socioeconomic variation within the united States. Journal of 
Educational Measurement, 26, 1-16. 
Raven, J. (2000). The Raven's Progressive Matrices: Change and stability over culture 
and time. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 1-48. 
Raykov, T., & Marcoulides, G. A. (2011). Introduction to psychometric theory. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control 
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80 (1, Whole 
No. 609). 
Rouse, W. B., & Morris, N. M. (1986). On looking into the black box: Prospects and 
limits in the search for mental models. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 349-363. 
Schmidt, A., Beauducel, A., Brocke, B., & Strobel, A. (2004). Vigilance performance 
and extraversion reconsidered: Some performance differences can indeed be 
induced. Personality & Individual Differences, 36, 1343-1351. 
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in 
personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of 
research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 262-274. 
Schvaneveldt, R. W. (1990). Pathfinder associative networks: Studies in knowledge 
organization. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
65 
Smith-Jentsch, K. A., Campbell, G. E., Milanovich, D. M., & Reynolds, A. M. (2001). 
Measuring teamwork mental models to support training needs assessment, 
development, and evaluation: Two empirical studies. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 22, 179-194. 
Solis, H. L., & Hall, K. (2009). Fatal workplace injuries in 2006: A collection of data 
and analysis (CFOI Report 1015). Retrieved from U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries website: 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/cfoibulletin2006.htm. 
Tett, R. P., Jackson, D. N., & Rothstein, M. (1991). Personality measures as predictors 
of job performance: A meta-analytic review. Personnel Psychology, 44, 703-742. 
West, R. J., Elander, J., & French, D. (1993). Mild social deviance, Type-A behaviour 
pattern and decision-making style as predictors of self-reported driving style and 
traffic accident risk. British Journal of Psychology, 84, 207-219. 
Williams, A. F., & Carsten, O. (1989). Driver age and crash involvement. American 
Journal of Public Health, 79, 326-327. 
 
66 
VITA 
 
Name:   Gonzalo Javier Muñoz Gálvez 
 
Address:  Department of Psychology 
   Texas A&M University 
   College Station, TX 77843-4235 
 
Email Address: gmunoz@tamu.edu 
 
Education:   M. S., Psychology, Texas A&M University, 2011.  
 B. S., Psychology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2002. 
